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The Territory-Identity Nexus in the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh: 
Implications for OSCE Peace Efforts 
NADIA MILANOVA 
 
Human Rights Without Frontiers Int., Belgium* 
 
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh stands out as the most intractable on the territory of the 
South Caucasus as it represents a combination of separatism and irredentism and has 
exacerbated the relations between two neighbouring countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan – 
whose geo-political orientation, subject to cross-cutting regional and external interests and 
influences, is still in the balance. Nagorno Karabakh is the first full-blown conflict where the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been primarily involved as 
a mediator and the first conflict related to the OSCE’s concrete talks to operationalize its 
concept of peacekeeping. This article argues that the OSCE normative context is one of the 
factors that has made the conflict resolution a daunting task. Focus is placed on the effect 
international norms and principles have on the conflict dynamics and on conflict resolution 
efforts in general. The article further examines the main constraints on reconciling the 
adversarial positions of the conflicting parties and concludes that there is a need for creating 
a framework to search for cooperative solutions based on common needs and interests.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Ethnicity itself is not the cause of ethnic strife. It is rather the sense of injustice based on 
collectively recognized individual victimization which leads to the realization of ethnicity 
(Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1993). Real or perceived inequalities in power, status and access to 
resources turn ethnicity into a political instrument for channelling ethnic-based interests, 
needs and objectives. The effectiveness of ethnicity as a political instrument emanates from 
the emotional attachment of individuals to a group. This emotional attachment can also be 
projected through a sense of belonging to a territory, thus linking identity with territory.1 In 
ethnic conflicts, therefore, the real or perceived threats to any ethnic group’s identity, well-
being and survival often have territorial dimensions. Like issues of identity, territorial 
issues can also trigger a sense of injustice, which can be defined as an “evaluative and 
emotional judgement based on the recognition that there is no appropriate correspondence 
between a person’s fate and that to which he or she is entitled” (Forsberg, 1996). 
Ethnic conflicts with territorial dimensions pose a major challenge to conflict resolution 
research and activities. Policy-makers and scholars alike regard such conflicts as 
potentially the most threatening phenomenon in the post-Cold War period, particularly in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as they have proved to be fairly violent and 
                                               
* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official opinion of Human Rights Without 
Frontiers, International. 
1 Vasquez (1995: 289) defines “human territoriality’ simply as “the tendency for humans to occupy and, if 
necessary, defend territory”. 
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long-standing. The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, defined as an amalgam of separatism 
and irredentism, is one of the test cases in this respect. How do we explain conflicts 
involving mobilized ethnicity which are aimed at changing the territorial status quo? Why 
was the increase in territorial disputes in the wake of the Cold War so poorly anticipated? 
And why have the responses of the international community come to be regarded as 
“retrospective, inconsistent, and confusing” (Forsberg, 1996: 433)?  
This article argues that the OSCE normative context is one factor that has made conflict 
resolution a daunting task. The focus of this article is on the effect international norms and 
principles have on the dynamics of conflict and on the efforts that are made towards its 
resolution. The article further seeks to examine what chances there are for peace when 
measured against the irreconcilability of the right to self-determination and territorial 
integrity as encoded in the OSCE documents. In what way has the OSCE normative basis 
affected the way conflicting parties interpret possible outcomes of the peace negotiation 
process? By tracking historical developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, both in 
terms of OSCE activities and conflict dynamics, the article draws two main conclusions: 1) 
that the legitimating power of international norms and principles is in a state of flux; and, 
2) that the attitude of the parties is often reflective of their own interpretation of these 
norms and principles.  
 
II.  The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Manifestations of the Territory-Identity Link 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus has seen some of the most violent and 
intractable conflicts spread across the region of the newly independent states, where ethnic 
assertiveness exploded in the 1990s as a result of policies of ethnic manipulation and 
politicization. As states born unexpectedly out of the collapse of the Soviet empire, 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been confronted with the simultaneous problems of 
forging nationhood and the re-emergence of subdued national aspirations. The legacy of the 
arbitrary construction of the boundaries of these countries, their lack of social cohesion and 
recent emergence into statehood have all raised the stakes of ethnic strife in the region and 
directed ethnic assertiveness towards issues of rights, legitimacy, and belonging.  
Among the three conflicts in the Caucasus,2 the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh with 
its mixture of separatism and irredentism represents the most complex and intricate pattern 
                                               
2 Two of them, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are on the territory of Georgia. The third conflict is Nagorno Karabakh. 
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of the territory-identity linkage and is, arguably, the most revealing in terms of conflicting 
interpretations over the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. 
Although a cease-fire has been effective since May 1994, it can be legitimately claimed 
that the “relative quiet is an eerie, delicate, deceptive balance” (EastWest Institute 1999: 
11), as the question as to who has the legitimate right to Nagorno Karabakh remains a 
deep-rooted and emotional source of suspicion, fear, and potential violence amongst the 
conflicting parties. 
The dispute of Nagorno Karabakh has its roots far in the past.3 The status of the area has 
been an issue since its incorporation by Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
With the declaration of independence by the Caucasian states in 1918, it was claimed by both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, while its fate was determined by the policies of other countries, 
leaving behind strong sentiments of betrayal and injustices. More recently, the status of the 
autonomous oblast of Nagorno Karabakh began to pose serious challenges to the politics of 
Michael Gorbachev, strongly demonstrating the underlying seriousness of the nationalities 
problem in the Soviet Union and the way they could jeopardize the course of 
democratization. Against the background of glasnost and perestroika, it was the call to 
remedy the injustices done to ethnic groups during the communist rule, which primarily 
galvanized opposition political forces in the Caucasus. In this respect, Nagorno Karabakh 
was the most blatant example of the inconsistency of Moscow’s nationalities policy, which 
in its turn alienated the nations and ethnic groups from the centre and invigorated their 
national aspirations and demands. 
Almost two years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the inconsistent and 
contradictory policies of the central authorities towards interethnic tensions in the region 
and their deliberate misuse to curb growing factionalization, actually turned Nagorno 
Karabakh into a catalyst for identical political tendencies in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
These common tendencies can be characterized by their vocal anti-Moscow sentiment, 
based on a presumption of support for the interests of the other country; a strong drive 
towards secession from the Soviet Union and independence as the only perceived way of 
protecting their own interests; and radicalization of the nationalist movements and their 
assumption of power.4  
                                               
3 For analysis of the region’s history, see Shireen Hunter (1993) and. Altstadt A.L. (1994)  
4 In Armenia, the nationalists defeated the communists in the June 1990 elections and Levon Ter-Petrossian 
became the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. In Azerbaijan, the events in January 1990 brought the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front to the centre of politics. For more on this topic, see S. Hunter (1994: 35-37; 68-70). 
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As Altstadt has pointed out, “at the most fundamental level the clash concerns a piece 
of land”, which the peoples of both Armenia and Azerbaijan “regard as historic patrimony 
and the present conflict is therefore bound up with historical claims” dating back to three 
distinct periods of development: the upsurge of the Armenian and Azerbaijani national 
movements in the nineteenth century; the period of independence of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan after World War I and the Bolshevik decisions; and the rise of national 
assertiveness in the 1980s (Alstadt 1994: 105). 
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh that unfolded in the wake of the demise of the 
Soviet Union can therefore be seen as a tangled pattern of past and present claims to 
territory. These claims have been advanced primarily in historical, rather than economic or 
strategic terms, which have greatly curbed the present processes of nation- and state-
building in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this way, the conflict has been built up on a 
series of escalating claims and counter-claims, which have seen each ethnic group, majority 
or minority, contend the exclusive right to the disputed territory. Herzig, for example, has 
consequently observed that “the strength of attachment to these claims reflects the specific 
Caucasian Soviet culture, in which both official and dissident thinkers gave history a 
privileged place in validating contemporary political and territorial claims”. In their 
essence, these historical claims are contradictory, as they have been put forward by 
“selective use of sources, by tendentious interpretation and on occasions, by deliberate 
falsification of the historical records” (Herzig, 1999: 59). 
Mainly during the first half of the 1990s, when the conflict reached its highest degree of 
intensity and endurance, scholars tried to explain the parties’ motives in terms ranging from 
religious animosity between Muslims and Christians, ethnic enmity between Armenians 
and Turks, and the manipulation by outside forces. Though all of these factors may be 
relevant to some degree, the conflict can, nevertheless, be best understood and explained in 
terms of its ethno-territorial dimension or, more precisely, in terms of national identity 
professed through the sense of belonging to a territory, which is based on historical ideas 
and collective myths. A closer look at this identity-territory dyad draws a clearer link 
between the rather intangible aspect of identity, which can be defined by various means, 
and a concrete issue as territory whose possession is believed to be “part of national duty to 
one’s fellow-nationals and to one’s ancestors” (Alstadt, 1994: 119). Therefore, in the 
conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, as in other conflicts of this type, it is the concrete issue of 
territory rather than national identity and consciousness that is propelling the differences 
between ethnic groups into animosity and violence. 
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For the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians, on the one side, the conflict has been a struggle 
for independence, which is perceived as the only guarantor of their security, especially 
outside the Soviet state structure and within a newly independent country that is struggling 
to assert its national identity on the international arena. The Armenians regard Nagorno 
Karabakh as part of their historical land where their right to self-determination should be 
preserved at all costs. Thus, Hunter has observed that Armenians fear that the loss of 
Nagorno Karabakh could shift the ethnic balance in favour of Azerbaijan and might lead to 
“Armenia’s demographic marginalisation in the region” (Hunter, 1994: 105). In this 
respect, the right to self-determination is respectively seen as a security guarantee for the 
Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh and the basis for a political settlement of the 
conflict. 
For Azerbaijan, on the other hand, the security of the region can be guaranteed only by 
reaffirming and safeguarding the principles of the respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states. The Azerbaijanis fear that the separation of Nagorno Karabakh would be 
the beginning of Azerbaijan’s disintegration.5 Moreover, for Azerbaijan the conflict is not 
between Nagorno Karabakh and itself, but between Azerbaijan and Armenia’s purported 
territorial claims. 
 
III.  Irreconcilability of the Principle of Territorial Integrity and the Right to Self-
Determination   
 
Since 1992, when Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, at the time still CSCE), the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh 
has proved the primary test case for the conflict management capabilities of this 
organization. By 1992, the conflict had already been escalating for several years and the 
warring parties had become entrenched in their positions on the major issue of contention. 
From the outset, the political settlement of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh has 
been discussed within the framework of the so-called ‘Minsk Group’. At the First 
Additional Meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 24 March 1992, the participating 
states agreed that a conference under the auspices of the then CSCE would provide an 
ongoing forum of negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis of the 
principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE. Further to that, it was agreed that the 
conference would take place in Minsk and would have as participants Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
                                               
5 S. Hunter (1993: 104-5) points out that this is not a far-fetched idea, given the existence of separatist 
tendencies among some Azerbaijani minorities such as Talysh and Lezghi. 
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Belarus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, 
Sweden, Turkey and United States of America. France, Russia, USA and Turkey were 
designated as countries, which had traditionally played a role in the region, while Germany, 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,6 and Sweden were included in their position of 
former, current and future Chairs of the organization. Since then, the Troika of countries 
dealing with the ongoing negotiations has rotated. As for “elected and other representatives 
of Nagorno Karabakh”, it was agreed that they would be invited to the Conference as 
“interested parties by the Chairman of the Conference after consultation with the States 
participating at the Conference”.7 In the institutional history of the OSCE, this is the first, 
and the last, application of the principle of delegating some tasks to an ad hoc group of 
states. The Minsk Conference, however, was never actually convened. In 1992, at the 
insistence of the US delegation, “preliminary emergency” negotiations within the informal 
framework of a ‘Minsk Group’ were launched with the purpose of preparing for a 
Conference. Thus the Minsk Group and its process, which is still functioning and is the 
only forum for negotiations on the political settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, 
were not created by organization’s decision, but “by high-level U.S. insistence” (Maresca, 
1996: 260). Nevertheless, while the Minsk Group held numerous rounds of negotiations in 
the first years of its existence, concrete proposals on possible settlement of the conflict 
were elaborated only after 1996 when the negotiation process was reinvigorated under the 
co-chairmanship of United States, Russia and France, leading to a noticeable increase in 
diplomatic activity.  
In reality, the break-up of the Soviet Union presented a major existential challenge to 
the OSCE as a descendant of the Helsinki process whose raison d’être was expressly to 
secure the inviolability of European Cold War borders and to preclude any aggression of 
one state against another. The shift of borders in the wake of the Cold War’s end, 
nevertheless, highlighted the complex fabric of interethnic relations prevalent in the post-
Soviet space, defying the tenets of the unified-centred approach8 to international relations 
and shifting focus from the possibility of cross-border war to the reality of internal wars.  
According to Miall et. al., it is therefore ironic to note that the task of managing 
conflicts has fallen primarily on organizations which are based on sovereignty and non-
                                               
6 In 1992, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was still one country. It split into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
1993. 
7 Summary of Conclusions of the First Additional Meeting of the Council of Ministers, CSCE, Helsinki, 1992 
8 Scholars admit that the Soviet Union was viewed as a unified bloc and all studies were centre-oriented without due 
account of questions related to nationalities. Following the Soviet Union collapse, the focus shifted towards relations 
between nationalities and relations between the centre and the periphery.  
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interference, while those very conflicts reflect the “collapse of sovereignty” (Miall et.al.  
1999: 34). In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the OSCE has had to take over 
the responsibility for a region saturated with ethnic conflicts for which the irreconcilability 
of the need to protect states’ territorial integrity and the claims of non-state entities to self-
determination can be considered as one of the stalling factors in any peace negotiations. 
This is especially the case with regard to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. In this 
respect, norms can be used in the explanation of ethnic conflicts with territorial dimension 
as they “are far more clearly connected to the salience of a historical territorial dispute than 
power relations” and “are important also as subjectively understood conceptions of justice, 
which played a major role as a motive for the dispute” (Forsberg, 1995: 31-7). 
A variety of norms serve to guide the behaviour of states in such a way as to produce 
collective outcomes commensurate to the outlined expectations. For the OSCE, these are 
the obligation of states to respect sovereign rights, the obligation to refrain from the use of 
force, the obligation to respect the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, the 
obligation to settle disputes peacefully and to refrain from intervening in internal affairs, 
the obligation to respect human rights as well as the equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples as stipulated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Therefore, norms are translated into 
the rights and obligations of states. Rules are those components of an international regime, 
which convert the regime norms into prescriptive or proscriptive actions. In this way, 
Kratochwil speaks of “rule density”, i.e. the number and specificity of rules that instil 
concrete meaning into a given norm, and specifies that it can vary considerably from one 
norm to another (Kratochwil, 1989: 10). This distinction with regard to the density of rules 
and their balanced distribution across the scale of norms is of importance to the analysis of 
the OSCE regime. Certain norms like peaceful settlement of disputes have generated 
detailed regulations and procedures. However, other norms have remained vague as the 
OSCE member states have failed to agree on corresponding rules that would govern 
relations on specific issues. A particular case in point is the self-determination norm, which 
has failed to live up to the expectations of some states on the basis of the vague prescription 
for its implementation. Contrary to norms where the correlation between their validity and 
claims is strong enough and guarantees explicit rules of commitment, the OSCE norms and 
especially the right to self-determination seem to be problematic, as the link between the 
legitimacy of the norm and the claims to independence has weakened. It can therefore be 
questioned what implications such a hypothesis can have on the viability of the OSCE 
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regime of norms and principles and what effect this can have on its conflict resolution 
activities. 
The underlying OSCE principles elaborated more than two decades ago, however, leave 
enough leeway for conflicting interpretation under present geopolitical conditions. The 
break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have led to the creation of a new social and 
political environment within which states and non-state entities alike have reformulated 
both their self-interests and objectives, thus challenging the viability and maintenance of 
the OSCE norms and principles. The efforts to marginalize the problem of how the OSCE 
principles and code of conduct can be applied in reality have contributed to the failure of 
all subsequent peace initiatives on Nagorno Karabakh. The confused signals as to the 
possible parameters of a political settlement in terms of the application of the OSCE 
principles triggered defiance and intransigence with the parties and they found their actions 
legitimate as long as their interests were safeguarded. From 1992 to 1996, for example, the 
OSCE lacked a clear understanding of the impact its own regime of norms and principles 
could have on the parties’ positions as to the legitimacy of their demands and interests. 
These institutional constraints subsequently came to the fore of the OSCE decision-making 
process at three of its meeting – the Emergency Meeting of the Committee of Senior 
Officials in 1993, the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs in 1993, and the 
Lisbon Summit in 1996.  
Azerbaijan requested the convening of an emergency meeting in 1993 in protest against 
the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity and sought the OSCE reaffirmation 
of these principles. The final statement worked out as a compromise between proposals put 
forward by the Minsk Group Chairman and Russia, however, fell short of Azerbaijan’s 
expectation for a “serious and strong decision demanding from the Republic of Armenia 
the cessation of aggression and immediate withdrawal of all occupying Armenian forces” 
(Interpretative Statement, Azerbaijan, 1993). Though the final statement spoke about 
“occupying forces” in general and did not specifically name any countries, Armenia vetoed 
its adoption as a signal of its strength at a time when the OSCE and individual countries 
were reluctant to address Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in definite terms. The final 
statement, stripped of any substantive meaning and implications, could consequently only 
be recorded in the journal of the meeting alongside the interpretative statements by the 
delegations of Azerbaijan and Turkey demanding the adoption of decisions without the 
consent of Armenia, a measure the OSCE was reluctant to take. 
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 With the escalation of military activities in 1993, the OSCE delegations and the Minsk 
Group focused their attention and efforts on operational issues through which they sought 
to achieve an effective cease-fire and de-escalation of military activities. For the parties, 
however, the cease-fire was not an end in itself and without having their concerns 
addressed, they were not prepared to settle any other issues. 
 In the months preceding the Rome Council Meeting in December 1993, the OSCE 
sought to push ahead with two issues – the adoption of ‘Adjusted Timetable of Urgent 
Measures for the Application of the UNSC Resolution 822’ and the preparation for sending 
Verification and Monitoring Missions to the conflict area. The parties, however, considered 
the implementation of these measures to be contingent entirely on the safeguarding of their 
interests and on firm guarantees given by the OSCE that their demands would be 
addressed. In the process of elaborating its first comprehensive peace plan, i.e. the Adjusted 
Timetable, the OSCE was confronted for the first time with the insurmountable obstacle to 
reconcile the status-security opposites in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, a situation which 
has haunted the organization ever since. At this juncture in October 1993, just two months 
before the Rome Council Meeting where delegations hoped to push through a number of 
substantive issues related to Nagorno Karabakh, the parties had solidified their perception 
of their own role in the conflict and of the outcome they would pursue in the negotiations. 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh agreed to the proposed Timetable since it followed the 
steps it favoured – cease-fire, restoration of communications, and withdrawal. For 
Azerbaijan the acceptance of such a sequence of measures would have amounted to 
capitulation. It consequently insisted first on the complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories and then restoration of communications. 
 Against this background, the Minsk Group submitted a revised version of the ‘Adjusted 
Timetable of Urgent Steps’ dated 12 November 1993 in which the cessation of military 
activities and the withdrawal from occupied territories took first place and preceded the 
restoration of communications and transportation. This version of the timetable, however, 
still lacked the explicit reference to the Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and it was therefore 
rejected outright by this party for disregard of its main concerns.  
 The first draft of the Rome Council document was submitted to delegations on 16 
November 1993. It contained a two-page decision on the conflict dealt with by the 
Conference on Nagorno Karabakh, which was primarily focused on the preparations for the 
deployment of OSCE verification and monitoring missions as well as the establishment of 
an initial OSCE presence in the area. In the subsequent drafts, the delegations included a 
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direct reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and 
all other states in the region, which immediately made the decision unacceptable to 
Armenia. The Azerbaijani delegation demanded a strong OSCE action to counter the 
Armenian veto. Delegations were not prepared for such a turn of events at this high-level 
meeting and their only reaction was therefore to attempt to prevent an impasse by 
producing a new draft, which evaded all the thorny issues. The new draft highlighted the 
OSCE concern about the continuation of the conflict and urged the parties to look for a 
common ground for consensus. The Chairman of the Minsk Group, however, was not in a 
position to bring the parties closer even on this mild decision on Nagorno Karabakh, which 
was to be included in the final communiqué. After several hours of delay and confusion, 
Azerbaijan voiced its adamant position as to the inclusion of a direct reference to its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty either in the final communiqué or in a separate 
statement. The Chairman of the meeting failed to put forward such a statement and 
Azerbaijan vetoed the whole decision on Nagorno Karabakh, instead elucidating its 
position in an interpretative statement in the journal of the meeting.  
For the next three years leading up to the Lisbon Summit Meeting, the OSCE 
negotiations on Nagorno Karabakh continuously revolved around the issue of how the 
principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination should be interpreted 
and applied in this concrete case. This issue turned out to be an unforeseen stumbling block 
in the subsequent negotiations. On their side, frustrated by the neglect of their main 
interests, the parties felt the constant pressure to make concessions, which they considered 
unnecessary in the context of the ongoing peace efforts. Distrust between the parties and 
their lack of confidence towards the OSCE mediation efforts has been an adverse and, 
unfortunately, a decisive factor in the search for peace in Nagorno Karabakh. In 1994, the 
OSCE tried to overcome the negative consequences of the Rome Council Meeting and 
rigorously took up the task of establishing an OSCE presence in the region and deploying 
peacekeeping forces there. This time, as before, delegations pushed aside the uneasy 
question of the application of the OSCE principles and norms in practice. Instead, the 
Minsk Group decided to pursue the line of confidence-building measures in the region by 
consolidating its humanitarian assistance to the affected countries and setting up the basis 
for sending its peacekeeping force as a security guarantee. The parties welcomed these 
activities but increasingly insisted on parallel negotiations aimed at reaching a consensus 
on the fundamental issues of the political settlement and considered the deployment of any 
peacekeeping forces possible only after such consensus.  
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The decision on the deployment of peacekeeping forces was adopted at the Budapest 
Summit Meeting in December 1994. Although the document seems to be of pivotal 
importance to the peace process in Nagorno Karabakh, it nevertheless carries the typical 
overtones of OSCE decisions. In essence, it sounds more like a declaration of intentions 
that is devoid of any political weight since its cornerstone is the conclusion of a political 
settlement that has been elusive for the whole period of OSCE involvement in the conflict. 
Though the decision clearly stipulates that the peacekeeping forces can be introduced only 
after the conclusion of a political accord, the OSCE focused its attention and efforts on 
developing a concept of operation of a possible mission. The main concerns of the parties, 
however, remained unaltered and they urged a consensus on an agreement, which sought to 
allay their apprehensions. In the absence of such political agreement, even discussions 
related to some operational aspects of a prospective deployment were viewed as a threat 
and the parties were therefore reluctant to engage in such talks before the OSCE clarified 
issues relating to the overall status of Nagorno Karabakh and the security of the region.  
In the wake of the Rome Council Meeting, where the polemics over OSCE principles 
played a crucial role in the negotiations, the parties became even more focused on their 
own interests, while the OSCE readily devoted its time to the preparation of its first full-
scale peacekeeping operation. The rhetoric of the previous years not only did not subside 
but also gained a new momentum and in 1995-96, the parties became increasingly 
preoccupied with their own interpretation of these principles. Within the discussions on the 
Security Model and at other meetings Azerbaijan constantly referred to its territorial 
integrity as the only basis for a political settlement, while Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh 
insisted that they could not accept the priority of the principle of territorial integrity of 
states over other principles.  
The Lisbon Summit Meeting was therefore the second high-level opportunity used by 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to play their cards on issues of self-determination and territorial 
integrity respectively with regard to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. The main clash 
came as a result of the strong resistance by Armenia to a specific reference to Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity, contained in paragraph 20 of the political declaration. To overcome 
Armenia’s veto, paragraph 20 was omitted from the final text, leaving the Lisbon Summit 
Declaration without any reference to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. This was a 
repetition of what had happened in Rome in 1993. Unlike Rome, however, the Chairman 
along with the other OSCE participating states, except for Armenia, issued a special 
statement as a last minute compromise containing three “principles, which should form part 
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of the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict”.9 These principles are the territorial 
integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the highest degree of self-rule of Nagorno Karabakh 
within Azerbaijan, and guaranteed security for Nagorno Karabakh and its population.10  
Though drafted in haste and under pressure, this statement is a clear reflection of the 
new approach the OSCE adopted towards the prolonged Nagorno Karabakh conflict. 
Avoiding any in-depth discussions on the implications of its years-old normative setting in 
a new political context, the OSCE felt the urgency to present its new understanding of a 
possible solution to the conflict. Though this statement may look like an unexpected turn, 
the exasperation of the international community with the continued impasse as well as the 
new economic interests in the region that were unfolding throughout 1995-96 suggested 
stronger actions was needed towards the parties and a more categorical approach to the 
conflict. Understandably, Azerbaijan and Armenia interpreted the outcome of the summit 
in opposite ways. The political leaderships in both countries had been under constant 
domestic pressure to defend their respective interests and they were therefore at pains to 
present their country as a ‘winner’ at the talks. The Armenian president claimed the 
exclusion of the text on Nagorno Karabakh from the final document as a great victory, 
while the Azerbaijan’s president instead highlighted the Chairman’s statement, reaffirming 
the country’s territorial integrity.  
The foregoing examination of the decision-making process at three OSCE meetings 
spanning the three years from 1993 to 1996 has sought to demonstrate that situations in 
which the normative context is in flux can give rise to various interpretations and 
definitions of the same problem. The need to develop a common understanding in response 
to a changing context is, nevertheless, particularly relevant to conflict resolution activities 
with regard to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. First, the OSCE norms and principles 
are elaborated through a sophisticated and complex process of political bargaining dating 
back to the realities of the Cold War. Historically, they fit into the mould of the rationalist 
approach conceiving of norms and rules as functional responses of rational actors to 
perceived collective action problems (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 23-6; 30-5). On the other 
side, their explicit verbal formulation is not justifiable for lack of binding force and explicit 
rules of implementation, which in the context of the post Cold-War realities have led to 
                                               
9 Statement of the OSCE Chairman, Annex 1, Lisbon Summit Document 1996. 
10 Following the Chairman’s statement, the Delegation of Armenia stated that it “predetermines the status of 
Nagorno Karabakh, contradicting the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council of 1992, which referred this 
issue to the competence of the OSCE Minsk Conference, to be convened after the conclusion of a political 
agreement”. See Annex 2 of the Lisbon Summit Document 1996.  
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loss of commonality of interests and actions. The changes in behaviour prompted by a 
change of interests, however, presuppose the need to develop a common understanding and 
expectations. This point is particularly relevant for the OSCE regime of norms and 
principles whose cohesion has been affected by the fact that the link between the 
legitimacy of the self-determination norm and the validity of claims to independence has 
weakened owing to its potential to trigger conflicts of major military scale and further 
splintering processes.  
Second, the approach to normative arrangements as dynamic phenomena has been 
missing from the OSCE mediation activities for most of the post-Cold War period, while 
the parties to the conflict were entrenched in their self-interpretation and self-definition of 
the OSCE regime of norms and principles. As the irreconcilability of the principles of 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination is considered too difficult to 
overcome, the OSCE seems to have discarded the possibility of forging convergent 
expectations through political discourse and agreement on common interpretations. 
The interpretation of norms and principles and the emphasis on common interpretation 
and convergent expectations furthermore touch upon another issue that is important in the 
search for political solutions to conflicts such as Nagorno Karabakh, and particularly where 
the domestic factor is as equally important as the need for international discourse. These 
are the issues of justice and fairness as perceived by the parties to a conflict. Confined to a 
situation of stalemate where a mutually acceptable compromise is difficult to reach, 
Nagorno Karabakh adds to the list of long-running, deep-rooted and intractable conflicts. 
As such, the outcome of any peace agreement will be contingent on the ability of the 
domestic audience to move away from the mentality of entrenchment despite the readiness 
of the countries’ leadership to opt for compromises. This was the problem faced by the 
OSCE negotiators throughout 2001, when the official high-level expectations for a peace 
plan ran contrary to the domestic fears and mounting suspicion of injustice and unfairness 
as regards their main concerns.  
 
IV.  The ‘Enduring Rivalry’ Context – Implications for the OSCE Peace Process 
 
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh represents an interesting case for empirical research 
of ‘enduring rivalry’ theories of conflict, as the political and psychological dimensions of 
the confrontation can be expected to be deep-rooted, permeating society at both the 
individual and public levels, while the behaviour of the parties is greatly influenced by past 
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grievances.11 Under such circumstances, “it becomes increasingly difficult to view specific 
conflicts as independent phenomena and to extract them from their rivalry system without 
distorting the context in which they occur” (Thomson, 1995: 196-7). If we assume that 
there is no alternative to conflict resolution within the specifics of the rivalry system and 
within the frame of conflicting interests, then it can be hypothesized that a major 
precondition for a successful peace process would be the shared concepts of justice and 
fairness. Under such circumstances, the conflicting parties will be in a position to opt for 
compromises commensurate to their equalized expectations and the negotiations will be in 
fact guided and facilitated by the shared desire to reach a just solution (Albin, 1999: 262-5). 
The so-called ‘concession-convergence’ model, however, is difficult to apply to conflicts 
like Nagorno Karabakh, where the negotiation outcome is viewed by the parties primarily 
as zero-sum and the conflicting notions of justice and fairness themselves become part of 
the negotiation process. For the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, the predominant 
asymmetrical dimension is the irreconcilability of the parties’ demands and objectives. For 
example, a guarantee of security of one side, like the presence of Armenian armed units in 
Nagorno Karabakh and the link between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, is perceived as 
an encroachment on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
Any workable formula for a political settlement to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh 
would eventually have to contain solutions to the four major issues of contention between 
the warring parties, which are (1) the status of Nagorno Karabakh; (2) the Armenian 
withdrawal from Azerbaijani territory; (3) the security of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh; 
and (4) the return of Azerbaijani refugees. The issues in the conflict are complex and 
intertwined and the greatest challenge to the Minsk Group has been whether to tackle them 
concurrently or successively, leaving decisions on the status of Nagorno Karabakh to a later 
stage, possibly the promised Minsk Conference. On the basis of this reasoning, the OSCE has 
recently tested the feasibility of two approaches to conflict settlement – ‘package’ or ‘step-by-
step’.  
The first full-fledged peace plan worked out by the Minsk Group in July 1997 follows the 
‘package’ solution, emphasizing the need to solve certain aspects concurrently, owing to the 
interdependent nature of the major issues. At that time, the Minsk Group called for full self-
government of Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan, Armenian withdrawal from all of the 
                                               
11 The criteria defined for ‘enduring rivalry’ are: a minimum of five to seven militarized disputes, at least 20 
years between the outbreak of the first dispute and the termination of the last dispute, and a maximum of 10 
years between disputes/or identical and unresolved issues in the rivalry dispute. Definition by G. Goertz and 
P. Diehl as summarized in W.R. Thomson (1995). 
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occupied territories, return of Azerbaijani refugees, OSCE peacekeeping force to patrol the 
buffer zone, lease of Lachin from Azerbaijan to Nagorno Karabakh, lifting of all economic 
blockades (Emerson and Tocci, 2001). 
The most important aspect of the ‘package’ proposal is that it determines Nagorno 
Karabakh as “a territorial formation within Azerbaijan” whereby “the population of 
Nagorno Karabakh elects representatives to the parliament of Azerbaijan and takes part in 
the election of the president of Azerbaijan” (Margarian, 2001). Thus the ‘package’ proposal 
pre-determines the status of Nagorno Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan and it was 
thus declined by Armenia and the Armenian leadership of Nagorno Karabakh.  
Later in 1997, the Minsk Group launched its new strategy with a shift from the 
‘package’ to the ‘phased’ or ‘step-by-step’ option. The plan contains the same aspects as the 
previous version, i.e. Armenian withdrawal, return of refugees, blockade lifting, while 
postponing any decision on the status of Nagorno Karabakh until the last phase of the peace 
process (Hakala, 1998). Azerbaijan had accepted the proposal, while Armenia and the 
leadership of Nagorno Karabakh opposed the postponement of the status question as too 
risky and failing to take into account their security concerns. 
In 1998, the Minsk Group presented a new peace plan to the parties in the conflict 
based on the concept of ‘common state’, which would allow non-hierarchical relations 
between Azerbaijan and a de facto independent Nagorno Karabakh that would not have the 
right to unilateral secession (Emerson and Tocci, 2001). Article 1 of the published peace 
proposal stipulates that Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan shall form a common state to be 
governed by a joint commission comprised of representatives of the two entities (Danielyan 
and Peuch, 2001). This plan, envisaging the establishment of horizontal rather than vertical 
relations between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, was rejected by Baku while it was 
embraced by Yerevan and Stepanakert. 
The year 2001 then saw an increase in diplomatic activities and reinvigoration of the 
Minsk process. In July 2001, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Paris to 
discuss the so-called ‘Paris principles’ for the conflict settlement reiterating the ‘common 
state’ concept, the most essential aspect being the establishment of horizontal relations 
between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, thus ruling out the possibility of 
subordination. Under the proposed plan, neither of them can unilaterally change the 
provisions of the common state and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic would itself form its 
own executive, legislative, and judicial branches as well as a national guard and police 
(Danielyan and Peuch, 2001). 
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The last high-profile round of negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group 
were held in Key West, Florida, in April 2001. The peace plan proposed at that time 
reiterates some of the crucial aspects of earlier plans, including: 
 
· Withdrawal of Armenian troops from six of the seven Azeri districts, the 
seventh being Lachin, which provides the link between Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh; 
· Nagorno Karabakh together with Lachin would be allowed effective self-
government remaining only nominally part of Azerbaijan; 
· An internationally patrolled corridor, linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan 
through Armenian territory (Emerson and Tocci, 2001).12 
 
Though based on some of the elements of the 1998 concept, the reference to ‘common 
state’ has been abandoned as it was rejected earlier by Azerbaijan. However, the new plan 
would only ‘nominally’ leave Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan and would thus enjoy de 
facto although not de jure independence. In essence, Nagorno Karabakh would be loosely 
tied to Azerbaijan through non-hierarchical relations, yet directly linked territorially to 
Armenia through Lachin. 
Despite the prevailing optimism for a breakthrough throughout 2001, the parties’ stands 
on the issue of Karabakh’s status, which again happened to be the most crucial point in the 
negotiations, appeared to be as far apart as ever. While Azerbaijan had insisted on its 
territorial integrity by granting Nagorno Karabakh an autonomous status, Armenia and the 
leadership of Nagorno Karabakh rejected any ‘vertical’ subordination of the enclave to 
Baku. 
The table below demonstrates the asymmetry of demands and issues in the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict through an overview of the OSCE peace proposals: 
                                               
12 Despite the secrecy of the talks, certain aspects of the proposed plan were made known to the public. 
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Concept 
 
Implications for Azerbaijan 
 
Implications for 
Armenian side 
 
Rejected by/ on what 
grounds 
 
New principles Lisbon 
1996 
Territorial integrity affirmed  Highest degree of 
autonomy for NK 
Armenia refers to the 
Helsinki Principles 
 
‘Package’ peace plan – 
July 1997 
Territorial integrity 
affirmed/ vertical relations 
between Azerbaijan and NK 
NK status as an 
integral part of 
Azerbaijan 
predetermined 
 
Armenia and NK/against 
autonomy 
‘Phased’ peace plan – 
Dec. 1997 
Territorial integrity upheld/ 
vertical relations between 
Azerbaijan and NK 
NK status to be 
determined at a later 
stage 
Armenia/NK fear to lose 
strategic advantages, which 
would put them in a 
disadvantageous position at 
subsequent talks 
 
‘Common state’ plan – 
Nov.1998; 
Paris principles 2001; 
Key West talks - 2001 
Horizontal relations between 
Azerbaijan and NK/ NK 
receives an enhanced status 
NK is a territorial 
formation of a 
republican type/ 
Azerbaijan and NK are 
to sign a treaty on 
division of powers. 
 
Azerbaijan/the plan does not 
determine NK status as an 
integral part of Azerbaijan  
 
The sharp asymmetry in terms of major issues, objectives, and strategies to reconcile the 
conflicting interests respectively can be usefully discussed within two conceptual 
frameworks – ‘narrow’ or ‘contextual’ and ‘broad’ or ‘external’.13 The ‘narrow’ 
perspective concerns the interpretation of principles set out in the OSCE peace plans. The 
OSCE silence on any possible basis for political settlement up until 1996 and the 
subsequent shift from one position to another regarding the underlying principle of an 
agreement reinforced the asymmetrical structure of the conflict and the feeling that the 
conflict is inherently insurmountable. The ‘broad’ framework covers the principles of 
international law in general and the OSCE regime of norms and principles in particular. 
The way in which these principles are projected on to the processes of conflict resolution 
have led conflicting parties to question the legitimacy of the proposed peace plans, which 
address the main concerns of one or the other side but never both at the same time. Quite 
relevant to this case is the observation that “the extent of the search for satisfactory 
solutions to a problem depends in part on the belief that the environment is benign and that 
such options in fact exist” but “it is in the nature of crisis that most, if not all, policy 
alternatives are likely to be perceived as undesirable” (Holsti, 1972: 16). Depending on 
                                               
13 On this matter, see C. Albin (1999: 274) discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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which of the principles is proposed as the benchmark of a future settlement, each of the 
sides has been in a position either to promote the peace plan or to reject it. As a rule, every 
new peace proposal on Nagorno Karabakh has invariably been followed by a period of a 
prolonged deadlock, reinforcing the parties’ perceptions that the processes that propel their 
rivalry are extremely difficult to reverse. 
The OSCE approach to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict so far is a demonstration of the 
failing of the static model of resolution versus the need to employ more dynamic and 
developmental mechanisms. The static model described in the conflict resolution literature, 
i.e. focused on the trading of concessions on the basis of rationality and maximization of 
value by each side, cannot be successful in conflicts where positions prevent adversaries 
from reaching an agreement on a shared notion of justice or a priority principle of 
settlement. As presented in the table of OSCE peace plans since 1996 above, the 
negotiation strategy has been to concentrate on the “relationship of the asymmetries to the 
content of solutions” (Mitchell, 1991: 37). The peace proposals so far have displayed a 
very rigid characteristic, namely the tendency to link the objectives and demands to the 
impossibility to reconcile the inherent asymmetries of the conflict. It is true that for 
conflicts like Nagorno Karabakh it is legitimate to ask what alternatives are available and 
possible when the parties’ definitions of concerns and objectives preclude any possibility of 
a solution. The preceding part of this article deals with the normative flux as regards the 
OSCE regime of norms and principles and highlights the need for a common approach to 
their application. While it is unrealistic to expect that the international community will 
apply the same standards and criteria to different conflicts, the lack of unanimity on crucial 
normative issues gives rise to a diversity of expectations. The sequence of peace plans 
proposed by the OSCE in the past few years are a reflection of the tendency to concentrate 
on the parties’ positions rather than on their interests and needs. As the parties’ positions 
are conflicting and mutually exclusive, every plan would imply unilateral concessions 
rather than mutual trade-offs. Therefore, the lack of a shared definition of the problems and 
elaboration of common expectations has served to solidify the antagonistic positions and to 
reinforce the existing adversarial relationship among the parties. As Kelman (1982: 44) has 
observed, successful negotiations: 
Must aim for a resolution of the conflict, i.e. an outcome that – though of 
necessity involving compromise – leaves both parties better off, is responsive 
to their basic needs and concerns, and is at least minimally consistent with 
their sense of justice. They must entail a process that helps build mutual trust. 
And must produce agreements to which the parties are and feel committed. 
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The lack of search for a minimal sense of justice for each of the parties is, moreover, 
the harbinger of another problem. This is the misconception that the conflict would be 
instantly solved when and if the conflicting parties sign a detailed legal and political 
document. Such approaches tend to neglect the domestic context of conflict resolution, 
which at the end of the day is of crucial importance for conflicts like Nagorno Karabakh 
where the history of confrontation determines current perceptions and expectations for the 
future. On this point, the static approach emphasizes “the need to view domestic political 
constraints within the context of the core beliefs and interests shared by the state’s leaders” 
(Hagan, 1994: 198). Such perspectives fail to take into account that the inherent conflictual 
asymmetries have as much influence on reaching a shared basis for an agreement within 
the framework of official negotiations as on its implementation on domestic level. In 2000-
2001, the information on Nagorno Karabakh oscillated between speculations on an 
imminent agreement to be signed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and talks of 
‘betrayal of interests’ largely circulated in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Through the 
history of the negotiation process under the OSCE auspices, there has been the constant 
dilemma to protect the secrecy of the talks and at the same time to share information with 
the public. Within the existing asymmetries of the conflict, it is evident that any political 
agreement will have to imply compromises for all sides. Against the background of the 
secrecy of the OSCE talks, however, there is much room for various speculations and fear 
as well as mounting suspicion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh that such 
compromises might be detrimental to their own interests.  
So far, the chances that the parties’ positions will be reconciled through the currently 
existing static model of negotiations seem very slim, precisely because the mediation 
efforts were focused on finding half-way points of convergence between asymmetric 
adversarial positions. Such efforts are viewed both by the parties and their domestic publics 
as conflicting, incompatible, and sometimes arbitrary and requiring unjustified substantial 
compromises on their respective side.  
The emphasis on the adversarial positions versus the underlying needs and interests of 
conflicting communities distinguishes the static model of negotiations from the 
developmental paradigm of conflict resolution.14 The latter views the negotiation as a 
process of learning, developing and adjusting relationship moving away from the 
                                               
14 See R. Fisher and W. Ury (1987); C. Mitchell (1981); G.J. Stein (ed.) (1989).  
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adversarial, competitive and power-oriented frame to an interactive joint search of a co-
operative solution. In other words, such progress would represent a “shift from a winning 
to a conciliatory mentality” (Zartman, 1989: 9). 
As discussed above, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has so far displayed all the 
characteristics typical of the adversarial frame of viewing conflict and its possible 
resolution. At this stage of the existing relationship between the parties and of the 
negotiators’ approach to settlement, a potential agreement will eventually fail, as the focus 
on adversarial positions does not address the underlying needs, fears and concerns of the 
affected communities as well as their long-term interests. If a political agreement is signed 
within the adversarial frame, it will be based on a competitive, exclusive, win-lose, and 
power-oriented approach aiming at compromise on substantive issues by eliciting 
concessions. The implementation of such agreement would entail coercive measures raising 
questions as to its fairness to all parties.  
What will be the implications for the OSCE under this scenario? First, the peace plans 
put forward by the OSCE by now tend to over-emphasize the legalistic aspects of a future 
agreement. Though not much information is available to the public on specific aspects of 
these proposals, it is evident that the main issues revolve around the constitutional aspects 
of a political settlement and any compromise within this frame seem threatening to all 
conflicting parties. Second, if presumed that the OSCE is in a position to facilitate an 
agreement within the specifics of the adversarial frame, it would lack the enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure its implementation. 
The ‘enduring rivalry’ context presupposes a long process of social-psychological 
transformation of the conflicting parties and communities and, therefore, involvement of a 
wider group of civil leaders apart from the principal political authorities. On the other side, 
as the only forum for the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution, the OSCE commitment to 
such a process would need to work towards changing the perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviour of the conflicting parties. The conflict resolution literature has identified several 
instruments through which attitudinal change can be advanced. These are, for example, 
consultative meetings, problem-solving workshops, or communal-level training in conflict 
resolution. It is to be presumed that such initiatives can easily remain beyond the scope of 
the official negotiations under the OSCE auspices. This in itself represents a broadening of 
the scope of conflict resolution as it is no longer concentrated exclusively in the hands of 
international organizations and external agencies in “one-shot mediation efforts” and 
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advances the need to build conflict management capacity within societies. (Miall et al, 
1999 : 18-9). 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
One of the main obstacles to successful negotiation in deep-rooted, protracted conflicts like 
Nagorno Karabakh is that compromise appears unacceptable to the parties. This 
compromise is even more unacceptable when it emphasizes the legalistic aspects of a 
settlement in conditions of a changing normative basis as experienced by the OSCE in 
particular and international law in general, while the underlying fears and concerns of the 
affected communities are not truly addressed.  
It is not possible to extract peace negotiations from the existing rivalry system and view 
them as independent phenomena. Therefore, negotiations are affected greatly by the 
parties’ notions of justice and fairness that prevail. In terms of the OSCE negotiations on 
Nagorno Karabakh, this article points to the fact that locked within the asymmetries of the 
conflict, the parties do not view the outcome as a positive, integrative and cooperative 
game.  
A successful outcome of the negotiations would mean that the OSCE had managed to 
create a flexible evolutionary framework for developing the necessary infrastructure for 
cooperation and reciprocity. Such a framework would lower fears deriving from 
perceptions of insecurity and mistrust of the other party’s intentions. From the perspective 
of the integrative mode the problems are framed as common. For instance, insecurity of 
either side should be viewed as a concrete problem for both sides. The logic for this is that 
in feeling insecure, each side will act in ways that will make the other side feel insecure. 
This point is of special relevance to the OSCE conflict resolution activities on Nagorno 
Karabakh as the negotiation process has stayed primarily in the domain of the parties’ 
rights, while the latter have been difficult to determine in view of the irreconcilability of 
the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination in the way they are 
subjectively interpreted by the parties.  
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